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Federal administrative agencies play an important role in na-
tional policy,1 directing most of the day-to-day activities of the
federal government. The agencies pursue their separate tasks with
a good deal of autonomy, and yet the lines dividing their spheres of
activity are often unclear. When more than one agency pursues
similar goals through adjudication, the result may be duplicative
litigation.
The doctrine of preclusion is the procedural device generally
invoked to prevent such duplication. Preclusion can take two
forms: issue preclusion, which prevents a party from relitigating
issues it has already fully litigated, and claim preclusion, which
prevents a party from relitigating a claim when it participated in a
prior adjudication of these claims or when it was in privity with a
party to that litigation. It is this latter form of preclusion that
presents a special problem for government agencies.
In a bureaucracy as vast as the federal government, strict ap-
plication of claim preclusion could prevent agencies from pursuing
important policy goals. For example, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency ("EPA") both may regulate the discharge of toxic
chemicals from a particular factory; both may need to go to court
to enforce their regulations. But if for some reason OSHA com-
pletes its litigation against the factory before the EPA, subsequent
litigation by the EPA might be precluded. In cases where agencies
have such overlapping responsibilities and where one agency's liti-
gation could preclude legal action by the other, courts have been
unable to develop a workable test to balance the agency's interest
in litigating its claim against the interest of the judicial system and
parties in preventing duplicative suits.
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This role is not without controversy. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum L Rev
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The primary impediment to developing a workable claim pre-
clusion test is the troublesome concept of interagency privity.2 Two
approaches predominate in the federal courts.3 The traditional ap-
proach, which finds privity among all officers of the same govern-
ment, precludes an agency from relitigating a claim brought by any
other agency. Some courts have found this approach too preclusive
and have moved toward an ad hoc approach based loosely on an
agency's interests in a given case. Neither approach, however, con-
siders the importance of an agency's substantive mission or the
unique policy considerations that arise in government litigation. A
more balanced approach would weigh the complex public and pri-
vate interests underlying administrative activity against the poli-
cies of finality and judicial economy at the heart of the claim pre-
clusion doctrine.
This Comment considers such factors and proposes an alterna-
tive standard of interagency privity for claim preclusion: courts
should find privity between government agencies when the gov-
erning statutes and regulations describing their overlapping re-
sponsibilities and interests anticipate a single factual situation.
Only then can the courts be faithful to the traditional policies un-
derlying claim preclusion while recognizing the unique relation-
ships among administrative agencies and within the executive
branch.
Section I outlines the policies underlying claim preclusion, the
concept of privity, and the present federal administrative struc-
ture.4 Section II analyzes the existing judicial approaches to inter-
agency privity as well as two proposed solutions that the courts
have not adopted-the "common superior" and "extended primary
jurisdiction" approaches. Drawing on the lessons of these
unadopted alternative approaches, section III proposes a new stan-
dard for determining interagency privity, one based on the rela-
tionships among agencies as manifested in their enabling statutes.
Section III also demonstrates how the proposed standard would re-
solve typical administrative privity questions.
2 The courts have settled on a standard of privity for administrative issue preclusion,
but they have not developed one for administrative claim preclusion. See text at notes 46-
57.
, See text at notes 40-57.
" The problem of determining when state agencies are in privity with federal or other
state agencies may be as great as the problem of determining privity among federal agencies.
Since questions of privity among state agencies are complicated by issues of sovereignty,
federalism, and preemption, however, this Comment addresses only federal interagency
privity and the problem of coordinating federal agency litigation.
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I. POLICY OVERVIEW
A range of possible approaches exists to administrative claim
preclusion. The approaches at the extremes highlight the compet-
ing interests involved in interagency privity.5
A court could respect the autonomy within the administrative
structure and never find interagency privity.6 But precluding a
claim only when the same agency relitigates would open the way to
repetitious litigation, frustrating the values of finality and judicial
economy that the claim preclusion doctrine represents. At the
other extreme, a court could treat the agencies as one monolithic
"government," so that one agency's action would bind all others.'
5 Although this Comment uses a paradigm in which agencies act solely as parties, there
are cases in which they are both adjudicators and parties. In the past, many courts hesitated
to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion to administrative proceedings. In 1906, the Su-
preme Court refused to apply res judicata to administrative decisions, reasoning that they
were "executive" rather than "judicial" decisions, made in "a summary way, in order to
reach (a] 'prompt determination. . . .'" Pearson v Williams, 202 US 281, 285 (1906). But
sixty years later, in United States v Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384'US 394, 421
(1966), the Court repudiated that position. The Court accepted the application of res judi-
cata to agencies "[w]hen [the] agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed
issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to
litigate." Id at 422 (citing Sunshine Coal v Adkins, 310 US 381 (1940)); see also Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments § 83, comment b (American Law Institute, 1982). The Court
held, however, that in cases where an administrative agency acts merely as a fact-finding
body or uses less rigorous evidentiary standards than those required by courts, preclusion
should apply only if the agency employed certain procedural safeguards. Utah Construction,
384 US at 422.
The Supreme Court has since reaffirmed its approval of administrative claim preclu-
sion. Kremer v Chemical Construction Corp., 456 US 461, 484-85 n 26 (1982). Lower courts
now regularly recognize the preclusive force of administrative decisions when agencies act in
a judicial capacity, noting that the interest in preventing the harms of repetitious litigation
that underlies traditional claim preclusion also exists in the administrative context. Facchi-
ano v United States Department of Labor, 859 F2d 1163, 1167 (3d Cir 1988) ("an adminis-
trative tribunal cannot refuse to observe these preclusion principles when they do apply")
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83(1) and Kenneth C. Davis, 4 Administrative
Law Treatise § 2:19 at 78-80 (K.C. Davis, 2d ed 1983)); City of Pompano Beach v FAA, 774
F2d 1529, 1538-39 n 10 (11th Cir 1985) (emphasizing importance of "full opportunity to
litigate"); and Atlantic Richfield v Federal Energy Administration, 556 F2d 542, 549-50
(Temp Emerg Ct App 1977) (noting necessity of "fair adversary hearings ... supported by
substantial evidence"). See also Graybill v United States Postal Service, 782 F2d 1567, 1571
(Fed Cir 1986), and University of Tennessee v Elliott, 478 US 788, 798 (1986).
Not only have courts recognized the preclusive effect of certain administrative adjudica-
tions, they also have required agency adjudicators to determine for themselves whether
cases before them are precluded by prior judicial or administrative decisions. Facchiano, 859
F2d 1163. The approach suggested by this Comment intends to create a single test for inter-
agency privity regardless of whether the potentially preclusive case was adjudicated in a
court or administrative forum or whether the determination of privity is to be made at the
agency level or on review by a court.
6 For a discussion of agency autonomy, see text at notes 25-32.
' Courts traditionally favor this latter approach. See the discussion of the Sunshine
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This, however, would preclude an agency from acting regardless of
whether it had a reasonable opportunity to preserve its claims in
the first suit; agencies would be hindered in achieving the substan-
tive goals for which they were established. Any rule of privity,
therefore, must serve as the fulcrum upon which an agency's inter-
est in pursuing its substantive mission can be balanced against the
policies of finality and judicial economy underlying claim
preclusion.
A. Claim Preclusion and Privity Policy
The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that a final judg-
ment on the merits "bars further claims by parties or their privies
based on the same cause of action."" The cause of action is said to
be "merged" into a judgment for the plaintiff, and a judgment for
the defendant is said to "bar" subsequent suits by the original
plaintiff and its privies on the same transaction.'
1. Claim preclusion policy.
The courts recognize several policies underlying claim preclu-
sion and the related doctrine of issue preclusion. Foremost among
these are the goals of finality, consistency, judicial economy, and
fairness.10 Absent claim preclusion, plaintiffs could bring multiple
suits based on multiple claims for relief arising from a single trans-
action. Claim preclusion prevents plaintiffs from bringing the same
evidence into the same forum under different legal theories,11
thereby limiting inconsistency in court decisions, barring vexatious
suits, 12 and achieving judicial economy by preventing piecemeal lit-
igation." In contrast to issue preclusion, which only prohibits re-
rule in the text at notes 40-48.
' Montana v United States, 440 US 147, 153 (1979) (citing Cromwell v County of Sac,
94 US 351, 352 (1877)). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore, 439 US 322, 326 n 5 (1979).
9 Cooper v Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 US 867, 874 (1984); Migra v War-
ren City School District Board of Education, 465 US 75, 77 n 1 (1984); and Jones v City of
Alton, 757 F2d 878, 884 (7th Cir 1985).
10 Brown v Felsen, 442 US 127, 131 (1979); and Adkins v Allstate Insurance Co., 729
F2d 974, 976 (4th Cir 1984) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19, comment a
(cited in note 5) ("[F]airness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration, require
that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end."). See generally
Class v Norton, 505 F2d 123, 125 (2d Cir 1974).
11 See Kathios v General Motors, 862 F2d 944, 951 (1st Cir 1988) (emphasizing the
"state's disdain for litigatory replays"). For an oft-cited description of the policies justifying
claim preclusion, see Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 Yale L J 339 (1948).
12 Felsen, 442 US at 131.
" See generally Automatic Liquid Packaging, Inc. v Dominik, 852 F2d 1036 (7th Cir
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consideration of issues actually litigated and necessary to the out-
come in a prior suit,14 claim preclusion proscribes consideration of
all grounds of relief that could have been raised in a prior adjudi-
cation, regardless of whether they actually were raised. 5
The doctrine of claim preclusion binds both parties and their
privies to a prior judgment. Suppose Agency A brings a suit
against private defendant D; agency B would like to sue D on the
same transaction. If A and B are in privity, A's suit will bar B's. If
it happens that Agency A does not achieve Agency B's particular
policy goals, Agency B will nonetheless be unable to pursue those
goals through further litigation against D. Therefore, a rational
standard for determining agency privity is crucial to achieving a
balance between agency goals and claim preclusion policies of fi-
nality, consistency, and judicial economy.
2. Uncertain privity.
Unfortunately, the courts have not developed a clear formula-
tion of privity among administrative agencies. The term privity it-
self is largely conclusory; it does not clearly provide a basis "for
including or excluding one from the [preclusion] of a judgment. It
is merely a word used to say that the relationship between the one
who is a party on the record and another is close enough to include
that other within the [preclusion]."' 6 Recognizing the conclusory
nature of the term, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments re-
placed "privity" with the more descriptive phrases "person repre-
sented by a party" and "persons affected by a judgment.' 1 7 Never-
theless, the extent to which construction of the term privity may
expand the binding force of claim preclusion remains unclear.
Although privity has no formal definition, the concept is
anchored in several basic considerations. Privity requires a legally
cognizable relationship between a party to a completed action and
the party to be precluded. In essence, privity requires that the for-
1988); and Henry v Farmer City State Bank, 808 F2d 1228 (7th Cir 1986).
14 Parklane Hosiery, 439 US at 326 n 5; and Cromwell, 94 US at 353. See also Restate-
ment (Second) of Judgments § 27 (cited in note 5).
15 Felsen, 442 US at 131; and Chicot County Drainage District v Baxter State Bank,
308 US 371, 378 (1940).
1' Bruszewski v United States, 181 F2d 419, 423 (3d Cir 1950) (Goodrich concurring).
1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 41 (cited in note 5). See James R. Pielemeier,
Due Process Limitations on the Application of Collateral Estoppel Against Nonparties to
Prior Litigation, 63 BU L Rev 383, 387-88 (1983); and Restatement (Second) of Judgments
at 13-14. The Restatement also notes that the concepts of "transaction" and "claim" have
no rigid boundaries. Section 24, comments a and b.
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mer party represent the latter, 8 through a congruence of interests.
In order to find privity, the court must determine "that the parties
in the two actions are really and substantially in interest the
same."19 With government agencies, courts can approximate "in-
terests" from an agency's functions and responsibilities. 20 Thus, a
standard of interagency privity should reflect any congruence (or
lack thereof) in agency functions and responsibilities.
In addition, privity must comport with the requirements of
procedural due process: notice and the opportunity to be heard.2
Though claim preclusion denies a party any "right" to litigate, due
process requires that the nonparty have sufficient notice of other,
"representative" litigation in order to preserve its interests by, for
example, joining in the prior action or disputing the adequacy of
the representation.22 Therefore, an agency should not be precluded
1S See also James W. Moore, Jo Desha Lucas, and Thomas S. Currie, 1B Moore's Fed-
eral Practice 0.41111] at 390 (Matthew Bender, 2d ed 1984) ("Moore's") ("[P]ersons whose
interests are properly placed before the court by someone with standing to represent them
are bound by the matter determined in the proceeding.").
19 St. Louis Baptist Temple v FDIC, 605 F2d 1169, 1174 (10th Cir 1979) (privity has
been found in cases involving a person so identified in interest with another that he repre-
sents the same legal right). See also Carter v City of Emporia, 815 F2d 617, 620 n 3 (10th
Cir 1987) (under Kansas law, "privity involves direct representation of the nonparty's inter-
est as distinguished from participation by a nonparty or a nonprivy who cannot or chooses
not to intervene"); Hurt v Pullman Inc., 764 F2d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir 1985) (quoting
Moore's 0.41113.2] at 428 (cited in note 18)) ("where the names are the same but the
interests put into litigation belong to others, res judicata follows the interest and not the
name") (emphasis in original).
20 See Restatement (Second) of Judgments §36, comment f at 364 (cited in note 5):
If the second action involves an agency or official whose functions and responsibilities
are so distinct from those of the agency or official in the first action that applying
preclusion would interfere with the proper allocation of authority between them, the
earlier judgment should not be given preclusive effect in the second action.
21 Expert Electric v Levine, 554 F2d 1227, 1233 (2d Cir 1977) ("The threshold require-
ment of [privity] finds its roots in the ancient notion, now supplemented by the due process
clause, that a person cannot be bound by a judgment without notice of a claim and an
opportunity to be heard."); Moldovan v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 790 F2d 894, 899
(3d Cir 1986) (citing Hansberry v Lee, 311 US 32, 45 (1940)). See also Pielemeier, 63 BU L
Rev at 395-425 (cited in note 17) (detailing the due process underpinnings of the Restate-
ment's analysis of judgments binding nonparties).
22 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v Shutts, 472 US 797 (1985). In deciding whether an "opt
in" procedure is required in class action suits, the court stated:
If the forum State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff concerning a claim for money
damages or similar relief at law, it must provide minimal procedural due process pro-
tection. The plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and partici-
pate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel. The notice must be the
best practicable, 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise inter-
ested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.'
Id at 811-12 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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from litigating a claim unless it had sufficient notice of its privity
with the first agency to protect the claim.
B. Policy in the Administrative Context
Any application of claim preclusion to federal agencies must
account for certain unique aspects of the federal administrative
structure. Some aspects of that structure reinforce the interests
underlying traditional claim preclusion, but others conflict.
1. Size and autonomy.
Two characteristics of the federal administrative structure are
particularly salient to any claim preclusion analysis. First, it is
enormous. The Government Manual lists 456 separate agencies ap-
pearing in the Code of Federal Regulation. Each of these 456
agencies pursues its own aspect of federal policy, resulting in a
large amount of government litigation. To appreciate the amount
of litigation generated by agencies, consider that the federal gov-
ernment was involved in almost 30 percent of the civil cases ap-
pealed from the federal district courts to the federal circuit courts
in 1982.24
Such size and scope help account for a second distinctive as-
pect of the administrative state, the autonomy 25 and specialization
agencies have acquired.2 6 Agencies pursue their separate, substan-
23 Office of the Federal Register, The United States Government Manual 1988-89 841-
50 (GPO, 1988).
" United States v Mendoza, 464 US 154, 160 (1984), citing Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director 79, 82 (1982).
25 This autonomy is controversial, and several presidents have tried to limit it. In 1981,
for example, President Reagan issued a pair of executive orders, Numbers 12291 and 12498,
directing executive (but not independent) agencies to submit annual plans and all proposed
regulations to the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") for review. 1981 US Code
Congressional and Administrative News ("USCCAN"), vol 3 at B4-B10, B15-B17. For com-
mentary on this attempt to control executive agency actions, see Alan B. Morrison, OMB
Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv L
Rev 1059 (1986); and Christopher C. DeMuth and Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Re-
view of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv L Rev 1075 (1986). OMB review is limited to annual
plans and regulations, which do not encompass litigation, so the OMB does not coordinate
or prevent potentially duplicative agency litigation.
For a defense of agency autonomy on constitutional grounds, see Note, In Defense of
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 Yale L J 787 (1987).
26 On the relation between the increasing size and increasing autonomy of the federal
agencies, see Douglas H. Shumavon and H. Kenneth Hibbeln, eds, Administrative Discre-
tion and Public Policy Implementation 1 (Praeger, 1985):
As the size and complexity of government has [sic] increased, the roles and powers of
administrators as actors in the policy-making process have grown significantly .... In
the implementation process especially, administrators have become policy makers in
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tive public policy goals with little or no coordination.17 The execu-
tive branch exercises little direct control over agency litigation,2 s
and courts are reluctant to interfere with agencies' pursuit of their
missions.2 Though the Department of Justice has the primary au-
thority to conduct and coordinate litigation on behalf of the fed-
eral government and government bodies,30 at least thirty-five agen-
cies have some independent litigation authority.3
Although autonomous agencies pursue separate substantive
goals, more than one agency may be entitled to act on a given mat-
ter. For example, both OSHA, in its pursuit of safe workplaces,
and the EPA, in its pursuit of a healthy environment, regulate the
emission of benzene.3 2 When one agency pursues a goal in a differ-
ent fashion than another agency charged with a related task, a pri-
vate party defendant may face repetitive if not inconsistent gov-
ernment actions.
2. Precluding agency action.
The application of claim preclusion to agency actions impli-
cates complex and often conflicting interests. First, the harm to
their own right, often enjoying virtual autonomy as they exercise discretionary author-
ity accorded to them by legislative and executive institutions.
217 See id; and Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the
United States 67-126 (Norton, 2d ed 1979).
28 See Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 Fordham L Rev 1049, 1057-69 (1978). For a
history of the effort to coordinate government litigation in the Justice Department, see
Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Ex-
ecutive Power, 63 BU L Rev 59, 70-85 (1983).
29 See McKart v United States, 395 US 185, 194 (1969) ("The administrative agency is
created as a separate entity and invested with certain powers and duties. The courts ordina-
rily should not interfere with an agency until it has completed its action, or else has clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction.").
30 28 USC § 516 (1982).
31 Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate over Federal Litigation
Authority, 68 Judicature 70, 73 (1984) (agency count as of 1982). Agencies may not conduct
litigation on their own without congressional authorization. 5 USC § 3106 (1982).
To give the Attorney General more control over litigation, Executive Order 12146, 3
CFR 409 (July 18, 1979), created the Federal Litigation Council, chaired by the Attorney
General and including representatives from fifteen agencies. The Order did little to change
autonomous agency behavior. It did not require agencies to reduce duplicative litigation, but
merely established a notice system to facilitate communication, § 1-302, and only applied to
the fifteen agencies designated in § 1-102. See Dean v Harrington, 668 F Supp 646, 652-53
(E D Tenn 1987) (holding that the Order does not apply to the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity). Finally, under the Reagan Administration, the Council focused on litigation policy, not
coordination. Although the Council has been expanded to include representatives from all
agencies, it has been characterized as merely an "opportunity for the general counsels to get
to know each other." Olson, 68 Judicature at 77.
11 See 29 CFR § 1910.1028 (1988); and 40 CFR § 712.30 (1988).
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private parties of repetitious litigation supports preclusion. Sec-
ond, the inability of the government to assert a coordinated de-
fense to repetitious private party suits also favors preclusion.
When the government is a defendant, the size and autonomy of the
administrative structure may encourage private parties to initiate
multiple suits against different agencies, thereby burdening the re-
sources of courts and administrative forums. Third, the traditional
finality, consistency, judicial economy, and fairness rationales un-
derlying claim preclusion apply in the administrative context as
well.
Counseling against strict application of claim preclusion to
agencies is, among other things, the need to preserve each agency's
autonomy in pursuing distinct policy goals. As a general matter,
courts exhibit a degree of deference to agencies' special mission.
For example, under doctrines such as the requirement of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies, courts recognize congressional reli-
ance on agency expertise in certain areas of public policy." Courts
seek "to avoid premature interruption of the administrative pro-
cess, thereby preserving the integrity and autonomy of the
agency-particularly where the administrative agency has vested
in it discretionary powers or is intended to apply its expertise to
the problem before it.""4 This need to preserve agency autonomy
conflicts with strict administrative claim preclusion.
Other factors have influenced the courts' application of claim
preclusion to agencies. Courts have recognized the power of Con-
gress to limit the preclusive effect that administrative decisions 5
31 Weinberger v Salfi, 422 US 749, 765 (1975) ("Exhaustion is generally required as a
matter of preventing premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may
function efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to
afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise."); Lavallee
Northside Civic Association v Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Management Commission, 866
F2d 616, 620 (3d Cir 1989); Lyons v U.S. Marshals, 840 F2d 202, 204-05 (3d Cir 1985)
(noting that two policies underlying the exhaustion doctrine are "deference to Congress'
decision . . . that an independent administrative tribunal ... should serve as the initial
forum for dispute resolution" and "respect for administrative autonomy . . . ")(citations
omitted); and Ticor Title Insurance Co. v FTC, 814 F2d 731, 755 (DC Cir 1987) ("Since
administrative agencies, as autonomous bodies, always have an interest in avoiding judicial
interruption of their proceedings, courts require some showing of hardship to warrant judi-
cial intrusion into the agency's domain, even where the issues are otherwise generally fit for
review.").
3, United States ex rel Brooks v Clifford, 412 F2d 1137, 1138 (4th Cir 1969).
" Freedom Savings & Loan Association v Way, 757 F2d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir 1985)
(recognizing congressional intent to limit the "res judicata or collateral estoppel" effect of
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board because of the need for "extensive judicial involve-
ment in the registration and protection of trademarks") (citing Alexander v Gardner-Den-
ver Co., 415 US 36, 48-51 & n 10 (1974)).
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and court decisions have on subsequent administrative action. 6 At
other times, courts have skirted applying claim preclusion when
doing so would result in manifest injustice.3 The consensus seems
to be that claim preclusion applies much less rigidly to administra-
tive decisions than to court decisions. 8 Due process considerations
are also important to analyzing claim preclusion in the administra-
tive context. Due process requires that nonparties be given notice
and an opportunity to participate in a suit before the judgment in
that suit can bind them.3 9 The lack of formal coordination among
autonomous agencies increases the costs of obtaining notice of the
litigation activities of other agencies. Autonomy also increases an
agency's costs of acting upon this notice to preserve its interests.
The agency must either give up some autonomy by accelerating its
litigation activities to join in the actions of other agencies, or risk
losing any subsequent right to address certain claims.
Autonomy also makes it difficult to assess the adequacy of
representation of agency interests. Since agencies pursue separate
and distinct policies, courts have trouble determining when two
agencies' interests and responsibilities in a given action are similar
enough to invoke preclusion. Any standard of privity, therefore,
must protect an agency's substantive policy interests, minimize the
costs of obtaining and acting upon notice, and include a coherent
method of ensuring adequate representation.
" Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co., 415 US 36, 48-51 & n 10 (1974) (recognizing con-
gressional intent to allow a de novo action by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion despite an earlier, potentially preclusive arbitration action, because of a policy of "al-
low[ing] an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other
applicable state and federal statutes.")
37 Purter v Heckler, 771 F2d 682, 691 (3d Cir 1985) ("Rigid application of Ires judicata]
must be tempered by fairness and equity .. "); and Thompson v Schweiker, 665 F2d 936,
940-41 (9th Cir 1982) ("Both [issue and claim preclusion] are qualified or rejected when
their application would contravene an overriding public policy or result in manifest injus-
tice.") (quoting Tipler v E.L duPont deNemours and Co., 443 F2d 125, 128 (6th Cir 1971).
's See, for example, Chavez v Bowen, 844 F2d 691, 693 (9th Cir 1988); Facchiano, 859
F2d at 1167; and Purter, 771 F2d at 691.
'9 Administrative agencies, as parts of the government, would not seem to have life,
liberty, or property interests within the meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Nonetheless, due process concerns are a useful proxy for protecting the substantive missions
of agencies. See Deborah Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts,
and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 Vand L Rev 471, 516 (1986) ("In the traditional sense, an
administrative agency has no 'rights' that will be affected by an agency adjudicative hearing.
Practically speaking, however, the decision resulting from an administrative hearing may
affect substantially the parameters within which the agency must operate. In that sense,
administrative proceedings may affect the agency's right to take certain actions.") (empha-
sis added).
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In sum, the unique characteristics of the administrative
state-the extent of agencies' autonomy and the scope of their ac-
tivities-intensify the reasons both for and against applying claim
preclusion to administrative agencies. The increased potential for
duplicative litigation increases the finality and judicial economy
concerns behind claim preclusion, while agencies' special need to
pursue mandated policy initiatives with minimal interference in-
troduces a new concern advising against preclusion. A workable
concept of interagency privity must balance these competing
interests.
II. VARious APPROACHES TO INTERAGENCY PRMTY
In evaluating claim preclusion against agencies, courts have
yet to develop a standard of privity that considers all the relevant
policies. Two approaches to interagency privity dominate: the rigid
Sunshine rule and the overly flexible ad hoc approach.
A. The Sunshine Rule
1. Basis of the rule.
In Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v Adkins,40 Sunshine sought
to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") IRS from collecting
taxes on its coal even though a prior action against the National
Bituminous Coal Commission ("NBCC") had determined that the
coal was taxable. The Court held that the prior NBCC determina-
tion of the coal's status bound all other government agencies,
stating:
There is privity between officers of the same government so
that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representa-
tive of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the
same issue between that party and another officer of the
government.4'
With this broad language, the Court declared that all federal agen-
cies are in privity, a standard that five circuits continue to follow. 42
40 310 US 381 (1940).
4 Id at 402-03. As discussed below, the language speaks in terms of issue preclusion,
but some courts have followed the Sunshine rule in claim preclusion cases.
42 See Walsh v International Longshoremen's Assn., 630 F2d 864, 870 (1st Cir 1980);
Safir v Gibson, 432 F2d 137, 142-43 (2d Cir 1970); Schuster v Martin, 861 F2d 1369, 1373 n
7 (5th Cir 1988) (using Sunshine rule to find that state employees and agencies are in priv-
ity); Boone v Kurtz, 617 F2d 435, 436 (5th Cir 1980); Scott v Kuhlmann, 746 F2d 1377, 1378
(9th Cir 1984); and Environmental Defense Fund v NRC, 866 F2d 1263, 1269 (10th Cir
1989) (implicitly following Sunshine by declaring that EPA and NRC are in privity as mem-
1990]
The University of Chicago Law Review
To its credit, the rule is simple, but its breadth and inflexibil-
ity disserve agency interests and due process concerns. Conse-
quently, the courts have employed a variety of techniques to limit
the sweep of the rule.43 Some courts have permitted the second
agency's suit by finding that another element of claim preclusion,
such as the existence of a single transaction, is missing." Other
courts have found that the potential "injustice" resulting from an
inflexible application of the Sunshine rule warrants abandonment
of claim preclusion altogether in the administrative context.45
The circuits are also split on whether the Sunshine rule even
applies to claim preclusion. While five circuits hold that it does, 46
three now contend that Sunshine should be limited to the nar-
rower doctrine of issue preclusion that was directly involved in the
cases. 47 As this latter group of courts points out, though in its opin-
ion in Sunshine the Court used the term "res judicata" in its
broad sense, which includes both claim and issue preclusion, the
question in the case was whether the IRS could relitigate the same
issue that the NBCC had litigated-the tax status of Sunshine's
coal.48 Under this second group's interpretation, the Sunshine rule
bars agencies from relitigating those issues actually litigated in a
previous suit by another agency, but does not preclude agencies
from raising claims that could have been raised in a prior action.
2. Application of the rule.
Applying the Sunshine rule to claim preclusion in the admin-
istrative context would require each agency to undertake the Her-
bers of the "federal executive branch"). Until recently, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Cir-
cuits also followed Sunshine. See United States v Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F2d 977,
983 n 5 (3d Cir 1984) (tacitly applying a Sunshine-like approach); Mandarino v Pollard, 718
F2d 845, 850 (7th Cir 1983) ("A government and its officers are in privity for purposes of res
judicata."); and River Valley, Inc. v Dubuque County, 507 F2d 582, 586 (8th Cir 1974).
Compare the cases cited in note 47, limiting or abandoning the Sunshine rule.
43 Napier v Thirty or More Unidentified Federal Agents, 855 F2d 1080, 1086-87 n 2
(3d Cir 1988) (avoiding privity issue by deciding case on statute of limitations grounds); The
Evergreens v Nunan, 141 F2d 927 (2d Cir 1944) (adopting the now-discredited distinction
between mediate and ultimate facts to avoid a finding of privity).
44 See, for example, Athlone Industries, 746 F2d at 983 n 5 (finding privity, but decid-
ing that the suit was not precluded because it was brought on a different cause of action).
41 See text at notes 37-38.
" See, for example, Scott, 746 F2d at 1378. The First, Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits apply Sunshine in claim preclusion cases. See cases cited in note 42.
'4 These include the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. Napier, 855 F2d at 1086-87 n
2; Headley v Bacon, 828 F2d 1272, 1277 (8th Cir 1987); Beard v O'Neal, 728 F2d 894, 897
(7th Cir 1984); and Conner v Reinhard, 847 F2d 384, 396 (7th Cir 1988).
4' Sunshine, 310 US at 390-91.
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culean task of monitoring all other government litigation. Further-
more, the timing and strategy of.an agency's litigation is a large
part of that agency's implementation of its mandated policies. A
sweeping standard of privity frustrates congressional intent by re-
quiring all agencies potentially interested in a single transaction to
join in one action to preserve their claims, regardless of the agen-
cies' preparedness or the uniqueness of their missions.
Finally, a standard holding all government agencies in privity
fails to consider whether multiple litigation is intended or serves
public policy. The Sunshine rule assumes that multiple govern-
ment litigation is bad per se. While perhaps appropriate in the
1930s when agencies were fewer and less autonomous than they are
today, the rule creates major monitoring and coordination costs in
a modern governmental structure that grants many agencies inde-
pendent litigation authority. It prevents courts from balancing the
competing interests unique to agency litigation, and requires the
courts to devise exceptions and limitations to the rule in order to
avoid the harshness that flows from widespread preclusion.
B. Ad Hoc Determinations of Interagency Privity
The three circuits that limit the Sunshine rule to issue preclu-
sion49 have nonetheless failed to articulate a coherent standard of
interagency privity. These courts have taken an ad hoc approach to
claim preclusion, focusing the analysis of interagency privity on
two factors: congruence of interests and agency authority. These
factors, however, share the same flaws as the traditional concept of
privity; they are merely conclusory °
The first factor in the ad hoc approach, congruence of inter-
ests, inquires whether the interests of the agency to be precluded
in the present litigation are the same as those of the agency in the
prior litigation. For example, in Headley v Bacon, the Eighth Cir-
cuit used agency interests to decide whether police officers were in
privity with the city in two separate suits alleging the wrongful dis-
charge of a police officer.51 The court noted three differences be-
tween the claims in the two suits: (1) the first (against the city)
49 See text at notes 46-47.
"o See text at note 16.
51 828 F2d 1272 (8th Cir 1987). In the first suit (against the city), the court awarded
damages under Title VII. The subsequent suit against the police officers was under 42 USC
§§ 1982, 1983, and 1985 and alleged violation of due process, equal protection, and First
Amendment rights. Because of the similarity of the allegations in the two suits, the district
court found privity and granted summary judgment against the police officers.
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resulted in equitable relief while the second (against the officers)
sought compensatory and punitive damages; (2) the second pro-
vided a right to a jury trial while the first did not; and (3) the
claims provided the police and the city with contradictory de-
fenses. After listing these differences in interests, however, the
court failed to analyze their significance. Instead, it merely as-
serted that the difference in interests was sufficient to overturn the
district court's finding of privity.52 The court gave no guidance on
how to measure or balance these interests; nor did it indicate
whether other interests might be significant in other cases. Instead
of articulating a method to determine privity, the court merely re-
stated a traditional aspect of privity, the congruence of interests. 3
The second factor used in ad hoc analysis is agency authority:
Does the agency in the first suit have the authority to act on behalf
of the agency in the second suit?54 But here, as with the congru-
ence of interests inquiry, the courts provide no guidance for identi-
fying or measuring this authority. In Headley, the Eighth Circuit
pointed out that the police officers "were not in such clearly poli-
cymaking positions as to be the same sort of 'voice and hand' of a
municipality as its elected governing officials. '" 5 Using the same
authority rationale, the Fourth Circuit found that a state univer-
sity's president, chancellor, and dean-as agents with authority to
act on behalf of the school's board of regents-were in privity with
the board, so that an earlier state discrimination action against the
board barred further Title VII litigation against the officers.56
Neither court gave clear reasons for its conclusion that one govern-
mental entity had or lacked authority to represent another.
The congruence of interests and agency authority inquiries im-
pede proper analysis of interagency privity. A court that resorts to
"identity of interests" to determine privity without explaining
these interests fails to provide agencies with notice of potential
preclusion. In addition, an analysis of agency authority, even if
technically feasible, seems incompatible with a federal administra-
tive structure characterized by autonomous agencies pursuing sep-
" Headley, 828 F2d at 1279-80.
" See text at notes 18 and 19.
5 Note that Sunshine planted the seed for an "agency authority" approach:
The crucial point is whether or not in the earlier litigation the representative of the
United States had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the
issue in controversy.
310 US at 403.
Headley, 828 F2d at 1276.
" Kutzik v Young, 730 F2d 149, 152 (4th Cir 1984).
[57:195
Interagency Privity
arate and distinct missions.5 7 Since each federal agency has its own
separate policy goals, a standard of privity based on "authority to
act for others" may result in little or no preclusion at the federal
level.
D. Approaches Suggested by Commentators
Despite the weaknesses of existing judicial approaches to in-
teragency privity, few legal scholars have addressed the problem.
One commentator has suggested that agencies be held in privity
only when they answer to a common superior and are litigating for
non-regulatory purposes." While some duplicative executive
agency litigation that could be coordinated by superiors would be
curtailed by this approach,59 the approach exempts all indepen-
dent agencies from interagency preclusion. While the Sunshine ap-
proach precludes too many agencies, the common authority ap-
proach precludes too few.
A second commentator" has proposed that for each single
claim in which multiple agencies are interested, courts stay all but
one action. Courts would avoid ex post questions of interagency
claim preclusion by choosing the agency with the greatest expertise
to litigate the claim on behalf of the government. The court would
base its choice of agency on an extension of the primary jurisdic-
tion doctrine, under which courts stay judicial cases until the
agency with the greatest expertise decides the administrative
issues.61
This extended primary jurisdiction approach is also trouble-
some. First, it would block the litigation activities of all but the
"chosen" agency, possibly frustrating the policy interests that the
57 See text at notes 27-32.
8 Note, Res Judicata and Intra-governmental Inconsistencies, 49 Colum L Rev 640,
650-61 (1949). Non-regulatory purposes primarily involve fiscal activity, such as collecting
back taxes. Id at 651-53. This restriction is intended to prevent claim preclusion from inter-
fering with the important policy interests that drive agency litigation.
51 The Department of Justice does coordinate the litigation of those agencies for which
it acts as litigation counsel, but Congress has increased the independent litigation authority
of some agencies. See text at notes 27-31.
60 Note, Res Judicata and Administrative Jurisdiction-A Proposal for Resolving
Conflicts Between Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdiction, 35 Geo Wash L Rev 1056, 1063-
67 (1967).
61 See United States v Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 US 59 (1956). Primary juris-
diction "applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regula-
tory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in
such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the adminis-
trative body for its views." Id at 64.
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"unchosen" agencies seek to realize through litigation. If the "cho-
sen" agency decides not to litigate, no agency may litigate with re-
spect to the disputed transaction. Second, this approach would re-
quire courts to review the jurisdiction of every potentially
interested agency before any agency could litigate a case, resulting
in more judicial intrusion in administrative policy than current law
and the interests of finality and agency autonomy would allow.62
Despite their inability to solve the interagency privity prob-
lem, these commentators do provide important insights. Both un-
derscore the harshness and undesirability of the Sunshine rule
and, in contrast to the ad hoc approach, both attempt to develop a
principled mechanism for limiting interagency privity. The com-
mon authority approach attempts to resolve the problem of ob-
taining notice of potential preclusion within the existing adminis-
trative structure. The extended primary jurisdiction approach
addresses the root problem of overlapping agency jurisdiction.
Both approaches -underscore the need for a standard of privity that
comports with the realities of the existing administrative structure
instead of placing too much hope in radical departures from ex-
isting law.
III. SUGGESTION: A SPECIFIC OvERLAP APPROACH
An approach combining the virtues of these competing solu-
tions is the "specific overlap" approach. Under this approach,
courts would look for any overlapping jurisdiction from the stat-
utes and regulations that govern agencies. If the operative lan-
"2 The commentator suggesting this approach relies on a proposed amendment to the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC §§ 551 et seq (1982) ("APA"). Note, 35 Geo Wash L
Rev at 1065 (cited in note 60). At the time the note was published, Congress was considering
amending the APA to provide that: "[A]ny agency proceeding or investigation not within
the jurisdiction delegated to the agency and authorized by law upon a showing of irrepara-
ble injury may be enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction." Id at 1066, citing S 518,
90th Cong, 1st Sess § 9(a)(1967). This suggests that a court could, upon a- challenge to
agency jurisdiction, determine which agency has primary jurisdiction prior to any adminis-
trative action.
Congress did not approve this amendment, however, and at present the APA provides
that:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A preliminary, proce-
dural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to re-
view on the review of the final agency action.
APA, 5 USC § 704 (1982) (emphasis added). Absent a statute allowing judicial determina-
tion of primary jurisdiction prior to any agency action, a court's application of the extended
primary jurisdiction approach would violate the interests of finality and expertise embodied
in the APA.
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guage of the statutes or regulations under which the cases were
brought gives both agencies authority over a specific factual situa-
tion, the judge should find privity. Claim preclusion would thus
occur only when more than one agency is authorized to act in a
specifically described situation. For example, federal legislation
empowers both the Federal Trade Commission 6 and the Depart-
ment of Justice64 to bring suit to prevent the sale of falsely labelled
foods. Since both agencies specifically regulate the sale of falsely
labelled foods, a specific overlap approach would hold the two
agencies in privity with respect to cases involving the sale of such
foods.
In some instances, however, the operative language of the gov-
erning rules only gives the agencies authority over general factual
situations, and agency interests may only loosely overlap. General
overlap exists where the litigation of the agencies would not have
crossed paths but for some unique event or a long attenuated se-
ries of events.6 5 If a transaction interests more than one agency but
fits the general language of the governing rules only by coinci-
dence, the agencies are not in privity. For example, both the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the Department of
Transportation ("DOT") might investigate an overturned truck
that discharged hazardous liquids. The only reason the EPA, with
authority to regulate hazardous liquids, and the DOT, with author-
ity to regulate trucks, would be interested in the same transaction
is because the truck carried the liquids. If a factory discharged the
liquids, the DOT would not have been involved; if the overturned
truck carried water instead of hazardous liquids, the EPA would
not have been involved. The EPA and DOT authority to investi-
gate the accident only coincidentally overlaps, and the two agen-
cies should not be found in privity.
The specific overlap approach minimizes the costs of obtaining
notice of potential preclusion and ensures adequate representation
of agency interests. It limits the scope of privity to those agencies
whose separate authorities specifically overlap, giving them concur-
rent responsibilities over and congruent interests in a specific type
of transaction. The specific overlap approach precludes a finding of
privity where concurrent responsibilities are merely coincidental.
In planning litigation, agencies thus need only monitor those other
0' Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 USC §§ 52, 53 (1982).
" Federal Food and Drugs Act, 21 USC § 16 (1982).
" See text at notes 79-90, discussing FTC v Texaco, 555 F2d 862 (DC Cir 1977) and
Facchiano v United States Department of Labor, 859 F2d 1163 (3d Cir 1988).
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agencies with organic statutes or regulations that empower them to
deal with the same specific transactions.
The governing statutes and regulations provide an objective
basis for an agency to determine ex ante which other agencies are
its privies, without waiting for an ex post, possibly conclusory judi-
cial determination of primary jurisdiction and without monitoring
the litigation of countless other agencies. Although existing con-
cepts of agency interest and congruence of interests elude defini-
tion, the specific situations addressed by the statutes and regula-
tions empowering agencies to litigate can serve as proxies, just as
the relationships described in a contract provide an objective
method of determining privity.6
A. Case Law Hypotheticals
This section applies the specific overlap standard to several
factual situations and different statutes and regulations. The ex-
amples are drawn from actual cases in which one agency's action
could arguably preclude another agency's suit. The section will also
compare the outcomes under the specific overlap approach with
the outcomes dictated by rigorous application of the Sunshine
rule.6
1. Specific overlap: agency plaintiffs.
The first example draws on the factual situation and adminis-
trative posture that gave rise to the Sunshine rule.68 In 1937, Con-
gress passed the Bituminous Coal Act (the "Act"), 69 which enabled
the National Bituminous Coal Commission ("NBCC") to regulate
coal prices and impose certain taxes on coal producers. In August
1938, the NBCC held that Sunshine was subject to the regulations
promulgated under the Act and therefore would have to pay taxes
on its coal. 0 Completely apart from this litigation, the IRS insti-
6 See text at note 20.
17 Specific case examples were chosen because the agencies and disputes involved illus-
trate well the distinctions between the Sunshine rule and the specific overlap approach to
interagency privity. Most of these cases were not ultimately decided on claim preclusion
grounds, either because the parties did not raise the issue or because the courts did not
rigorously apply claim preclusion given the inflexibility of the Sunshine approach. See text
at notes 43-45.
68 Justice Douglas relates the facts and procedural history of the case at 310 US at 387-
91.
69 See 15 USC §§ 828-52 (1937). The sections involved in this discussion were repealed
on September 6, 1966 by Pub L No 89-554, §8(a), 80 Stat 649, 651 (1966).
70 This ruling was affirmed in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v National Bituminous
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tuted an action to collect the taxes Sunshine owed under the Act.
The Supreme Court reviewed this second action in Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v Adkins, noted above for its broad definition of
privity 1
For purposes of this example, suppose that the IRS and
NBCC claims arose from a single transaction, Sunshine's coal pro-
duction, and that both the NBCC and the IRS were trying to fine
Sunshine for not complying with the Act 2 If claim preclusion did
apply, the Court could bar the IRS action because the claim for tax
revenues would merge into the judgment in the NBCC action.
The only question left in determining whether Sunshine has a
valid claim preclusion defense is whether the IRS and the NBCC
are in privity. Under the Sunshine approach, the agencies are in
privity because they are part of the federal government. Under the
specific overlap approach also, the agencies are in privity. The Act
contains the statutory provisions authorizing both the IRS and
NBCC actions. Both provisions, therefore, address the same fac-
tual situations. The governing statute would have provided the
IRS with notice that it must monitor the NBCC's litigation activ-
ity and institute single actions covering both the regulatory and
tax claims. Consequently, the IRS would have been required to
raise its claim for taxes in the prior NBCC action or suffer
preclusion.
The statute in this example illustrates well the concurrent re-
sponsibilities and interests of the two agencies. Since the statute
applies to the IRS and the NBCC, both agencies are pursuing the
same substantive policies-those embodied in the Act. One agency
could adequately represent the other's interests in penalizing Sun-
shine for its noncompliance. The shared governing statute is a
cost-effective method of providing notice of potential preclusion.
The finding of privity is therefore supported by the policy consid-
erations previously discussed, and there is no reason to subject
Sunshine to repetitive litigation.
Coal Commission, 105 F2d 559 (8th Cir 1939).
71 See text at notes 40-48.
712 It is not clear whether the NBCC decision to regulate Sunshine and the IRS collec-
tion action arose from the same transaction. If, instead of trying to collect the back taxes
deemed recoverable in the NBCC action, the IRS was trying to collect a fine for prior non-
compliance with the Bituminous Coal Act, then the two actions seem more likely to have
arisen from a single transaction.
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2. Specific overlap: agency defendants.
The specific overlap approach can also determine interagency
privity when a case, or a series of cases, involves a private plaintiff
and agency defendants. In Mervin v FTC,73 the DC Circuit decided
that a claim for wrongful discharge against the Civil Service Com-
mission ("CSC") precluded a subsequent claim against the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC").74 The FTC had discharged the plain-
tiff, Mervin, as part of a workforce reduction. Mervin appealed his
discharge to the CSC, alleging that the FTC had not followed its
own regulations. The FTC's administrative regulations gave it au-
thority over workforce reductions,75 and the Code of Federal Regu-
lations gave the CSC authority to investigate government dis-
charges resulting from reductions in force.76 When the CSC
declined to hear Mervin's appeal, he petitioned the district court
for the District of Columbia to direct the CSC to consider the ap-
peal on its merits. The court dismissed his action for failure to
state a claim.7 7 Later, Mervin brought a suit directly against the
FTC for violating its regulations and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. On appeal, the DC Circuit found that claim
preclusion barred the second action because Mervin's claims
against the FTC arose from the same transaction as his claims
against the CSC, and under the Sunshine approach the FTC and
CSC would be in privity as two agencies of the federal
government."
The specific overlap approach would yield the same result.
Since the regulations giving rise to claims against both the FTC
and the CSC concern an FTC workforce reduction discharge, the
agencies would be deemed in privity. The regulations contemplate
the same specific factual pattern, and therefore the interests of the
FTC and the CSC are congruent. One can infer from the statutes
that CSC, with authority over all government discharges, was an
adequate representative of the FTC's interest in litigating an FTC
employee discharge suit, and the statutes provide adequate notice
of potential overlapping responsibilities. Therefore, the agencies
73 591 F2d 821 (DC Cir 1978).
" The functions performed by the CSC are now undertaken by the Office of Personnel
Management.
75 See Mervin, 591 F2d at 829, citing FTC Administrative Manual, § 5-430.22.
7' See Mervin, 591 F2d at 830.
7 Id, citing Mervin v United States Civil Service Comm'n, No 74-1297 (D DC, August
24, 1974).
78 Mervin, 591 F2d at 530-31.
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should be in privity and should be entitled to assert a defense of
claim preclusion.
3. Coincidental overlap: antitrust.
Coincidental overlap, which does not result in privity under
the specific overlap approach, is exemplified by the regulations at
issue in FTC v Texaco.7s Since 1945, the American Gas Association
("AGA"), a trade association representing producers, distributors,
and marketers of natural gas, has been providing estimates on the
levels of gas reserves. In 1969, shortly after a Federal Power Com-
mission ("FPC") order reevaluating gas prices, the AGA reported
the first decline in Southern Louisiana reserves. After a series of
reviews pursuant to the Natural Gas Act,"° which authorizes the
FPC to regulate natural gas prices, the FPC ruled that the AGA
data was reliable for rate-making.
The report of a decline in gas reserves led AGA members to
raise their rates. The increase in rates prompted the FTC to insti-
tute an investigation into possible collusion by the AGA in promot-
ing unfair trade. The AGA refused to cooperate with the FTC's
subpoenas in this second investigation, and the trial court held
that the prior FPC action finding the AGA data valid precluded
the FTC from investigating the issue of whether the data evi-
denced collusion.81 The DC Circuit reversed on the ground that the
FTC's antitrust investigation could not be precluded. The court
noted that the courts did not have the power to speculate about
what issues FTC had to investigate,82 and while AGA's data was
valid for FPC's ratemaking purposes, the data could still be ques-
tionable in the antitrust context.
Under the Sunshine approach, the court would find the FTC
and FPC in privity since both are government agencies. Yet the
two clearly had separate interests in the AGA report. The FPC was
primarily concerned with the accuracy of the gas rates; the FTC
sought to determine whether the gas rates were part of a scheme of
7' 555 F2d 862 (DC Cir 1977). The DC Circuit actually decided Texaco on issue preclu-
sion grounds, but claim preclusion arguably applied as well. Both the majority and dissent-
ing opinions provide a detailed history of the case. See Texaco, 555 F2d at 866-71 and 895-
98.
" 15 USC § 717(d) (1982). See Area Rate Proceeding (Southern Louisiana Area), 40
FPC 530 (1968).
", Texaco, 555 F2d at 878.
82 Id at 880. Although the discussion in the opinion revolves around issue preclusion,
the facts present a colorable claim preclusion defense. Here, the FTC and FPC launched
investigatory inquiries into the AGA report.
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collusion. Despite these differences in interest, the Sunshine ap-
proach would arbitrarily find privity.
Under the specific overlap approach, however, the FTC and
the FPC would not be in privity, because the statutes authorizing
their respective actions do not concern the same specific factual
situations. The Natural Gas Act authorizes the FPC to investigate
and set natural gas rates. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 3
which empowers the FTC "to prevent [certain parties] from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, '8 4 autho-
rizes the investigation into possible AGA collusion. These statutory
provisions do not address the same specific factual situation. The
FPC would set natural gas rates even if no unlawful collusion war-
ranted FTC action, and the FTC frequently investigates collusion
that does not involve natural gas rates. The general factual situa-
tions addressed by the statutes overlap only coincidentally. Conse-
quently, the FTC is not in privity with the FPC, and the FTC
claims of unlawful collusion should not be precluded by a prior
FPC action to fix natural gas rates. 5
4. Coincidental overlap: debarment.
Facchiano v United States Department of Labor 6 provides
another example in-which the suggested approach dictates a differ-
ent result than the Sunshine rule. In 1984, the Department of La-
bor ("DOL") investigated a construction project conducted by the
Facchiano Construction Company and funded by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") under the Commu-
nity Development Block Grant Program ("CDBG"). The DOL's in-
vestigation disclosed that Facchiano had covered up the payment
of unlawful wages to employees on the project,87 and led to the
conviction of the company and one of its principals for mail fraud.
11 15 USC § 41 et seq (1982).
84 Id at § 45(a)(2).
85 Both the defendants and the dissenting judges argued for issue preclusion based on a
primary jurisdiction analysis. Texaco, 555 F2d at 923-26. Since "[t]he Power Commission is
the federal agency with special technical and scientific expertise on factual issues involving
the oil and gas industry," the FTC should have been precluded from investigating the rates.
Id at 925-26 (Wilkey dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86 859 F2d 1163 (3d Cir 1988).
87 The Davis-Bacon Act, 40 USC § 276(a) (1982), and the Contract Work Hours and
Safety Standards Act, 40 USC §§ 327-32 (1982), require that workers employed under a
government contract be paid specified minimum wages. These statutes also require that
employer/contractors report employee wages to the DOL.
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In May 1985, HUD initiated an action to debar Facchiano
from the CDBG contract in response to the mail fraud convictions.
Debarment is authorized when a contractor has "been convicted of
crimes committed in the pursuit, the attempt to pursue, or the per-
formance of public or private contracts, where the conviction(s)
have put the contractors' integrity in doubt or where the conduct
involved is deemed 'serious' by the Assistant Secretary of HUD." '88
As a result, HUD debarred the company from all HUD contracts
for 18 months based on the 1984 mail fraud conviction. Also in
1986, the DOL tried to impose a second debarment from all gov-
ernment contracts for three years pursuant to a regulation empow-
ering it to debar government contractors for violations of the Da-
vis-Bacon Act and other regulations."' Rather than submit to the
second proceeding, Facchiano sought an injunction precluding the
second debarment.
Although the Third Circuit held that the injunction could not
be issued because Facchiano had not exhausted its administrative
remedies,90 this case does present a colorable claim preclusion de-
fense. Since both the HUD and DOL debarment actions stemmed
from false wage reporting, the DOL's claim for debarment would
be precluded by the HUD debarment if HUD and the DOL are in
privity.
Contrary to the outcome compelled by the Sunshine rule, the
agencies would not be in privity under the specific overlap ap-
proach. Although both sets of regulations involve debarment and
government contracts, the specific factual situations they cover dif-
fer. The HUD regulations authorize debarment for criminal con-
victions related to the performance of a HUD contract, regardless
of whether the convictions arose from violations of the Davis-Ba-
con Act. The DOL regulations require Davis-Bacon Act viola-
tions-but not necessarily convictions-for debarment. In addi-
tion, the scope of the debarment the two agencies were authorized
to impose differed. HUD could only debar a contractor from HUD
contracts, while the DOL could bar a contractor from all govern-
ment contracts. That both regulations apply to the facts of Facchi-
ano is mere coincidence; the agencies lack the congruence of inter-
ests present in the Sunshine and Mervin hypotheticals. Therefore,
even though DOL may have known that HUD would try to debar
Facchiano, HUD could not have adequately represented DOL ab-
11 Facchiano, 859 F2d at 1165, citing 24 CFR §§ 24.6(a)(1), (4) and (9) (1985).
89 Id at 1166, citing 29 CFR § 5.12(b)(1) (1985).
90 Id at 1169.
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sent a congruence of interests, and the two agencies would not be
in privity.
B. The Specific Overlap Approach and Policy
As the hypotheticals based on Sunshine and Mervin demon-
strate, the specific overlap approach sometimes yields the same re-
sult as the traditional Sunshine rule. Like the Sunshine approach,
the specific overlap approach can determine privity whether the
agencies are plaintiffs or defendants. The two approaches differ in
that the specific overlap approach limits privity where the agencies
lack congruent interests in and responsibilities over a specific fac-
tual situation. The specific overlap approach imputes notice of a
prior agency action only when the second agency can expect the
first agency to be dealing directly with the same factual situations,
thereby undercutting the broad sweep of the traditional Sunshine
approach.
The specific overlap approach accommodates the basic policies
underlying agency claim preclusion while avoiding the problems in-
herent in other approaches to privity. First, although it is not as
restrictive as the Sunshine rule, the specific overlap approach will
significantly limit duplicative agency litigation over single transac-
tions. In addition, the specific overlap approach will limit such liti-
gation more than the common authority approach, since its preclu-
sive force rests directly on the scope of an agency's sphere of
activity rather than relying on the existence of a common superior.
Third, unlike the Sunshine rule or the extended primary juris-
diction approach, the specific overlap approach grounds inter-
agency privity in recognizable relationships and provides a reason-
able means for agencies to obtain notice of potential preclusion.
After an initial reading of statutes and regulations for possible con-
gruence of authority over specific factual situations (plus reading
of new statutes and regulations), agencies need only monitor those
agencies whose jurisdiction or sphere of litigation activity overlaps
their own in specific factual situations. Since agencies deal with
statutes and regulations intimately and can be presumed to know
the law, the costs of monitoring are lower under this approach than
under the Sunshine or primary jurisdiction approaches.
The remaining monitoring costs are simply the by-product of
an administrative structure characterized by agency autonomy.
Given this autonomy, some monitoring costs are unavoidable. 91
91 Although a central body providing information on concurrent activities of other
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Agencies can reduce monitoring costs by developing informal coor-
dination procedures.2 Moreover, since notice hinges on the pro-
mulgation of a statute or regulation giving an agency authority to
litigate over a specific factual situation, notice will occur well in
advance of actual preclusion. Because an agency has advance no-
tice that it is in privity with certain other agencies, it can take
steps to reduce the costs of preserving its claims before another
agency litigates the same transaction.
Most importantly, the specific overlap approach minimizes in-
terference with agency policy objectives. Absent litigation by an-
other authorized agency, an agency is free to plan and schedule its
litigation in whatever way it sees fit. Unlike the extended primary
jurisdiction approach, the specific overlap approach will not block
agency action through a pre-administrative judicial determination
of jurisdiction, and agencies can act regardless of whether a court
believes that another agency has greater expertise. Of course, once
an agency acts, others with overlapping jurisdiction must join in or
be precluded, but since agencies know of potential preclusion well
in advance through statutes and regulations, they have ample time
to coordinate their policy with that of the active agency. The sug-
gested approach respects Congress's delegation of litigation and
decision making authority to agencies.
Finally, implementation of the suggested approach may yield
two other results. First, as courts and administrative tribunals dis-
play an increased interest in statutes and regulations, legislators
and rulemakers may pay more attention to the way they distribute
litigation power among agencies. Given a concrete definition of
privity, legislators and rulemakers can delegate authority in such a
way that the procedural constraints of claim preclusion can ad-
vance administrative policy. Second, courts will apply claim pre-
agencies might be a simple answer to the problem of monitoring costs, the specific overlap
approach is intended to be effective without major structural changes in the administrative
state. Such a coordinating body might resolve problems of privity and notice, but only at
the expense of creating such a body and foregoing some degree of agency autonomy. More-
over, such a body might prove ineffective. See notes 25, 28, and 31 concerning the failure of
the Department of Justice and the OMB to coordinate agency litigation. A less costly and
intrusive solution would be to allow agencies to develop procedures for following one an-
other's litigation, such as appointing liaison officers to coordinate litigation with other privy
agencies. The specific overlap approach fosters such informal coordination. See note 92.
92 Since 1948, the Justice Department and the FTC have formally and informally coor-
dinated their overlapping litigation of antitrust suits. David L. Roll, Dual Enforcement of
the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and the FTC: The Liaison Procedure, 31
Bus Law 2075, 2077-80 (1976). Each agency appoints a liaison officer to exchange informa-
tion concerning litigation and investigations of antitrust violations, and the agencies have
agreed to divide investigatory activity by industry.
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clusion more consistently in administrative proceedings. Since the
proposed standard is more flexible than the Sunshine approach
and accommodates the special considerations of governmental liti-
gants, courts can apply claim preclusion in the administrative con-
text without resort to the arbitrary limits and restrictions previ-
ously needed to ensure just results.
